Abstract. Implementations of cryptographic protocols, such as OpenSSL for example, contain bugs affecting security, which cannot be detected by just analyzing abstract protocols (e.g., SSL or TLS). We describe how cryptographic protocol verification techniques based on solving clause sets can be applied to detect vulnerabilities of C programs in the Dolev-Yao model, statically. This involves integrating fairly simple pointer analysis techniques with an analysis of which messages an external intruder may collect and forge. This also involves relating concrete run-time data with abstract, logical terms representing messages. To this end, we make use of so-called trust assertions. The output of the analysis is a set of clauses in the decidable class § ¥ , which can then be solved independently. This can be used to establish secrecy properties, and to detect some other bugs.
Introduction
Cryptographic protocol verification has come of age: there are now many ways of verifying cryptographic protocols in the literature (see [12] for a sampler). They all start from a fairly abstract specification of the protocol. However, in real life, what you use when you type ssh or when you connect to a securized site on your Web browser is not a 5-line abstract protocol but a complete program. While this program is intended to implement some protocol, there is no guarantee it actually implements it in any way. The purpose of this paper is to make a few first steps in the direction of analyzing cryptographic protocols directly from source code.
To make things concrete, here is a specification of while authenticating themselves mutually [19] . It is well-known that there is an attack against this protocol (see [17] ). This attack also makes 0 available to the intruder, although 0 was meant to remain secret. Figure 1 reads as follows: any agent implementing¨'s role will first create a fresh nonce , typically by drawing a number at random, then build the pair wherë is taken to be¨'s identity (some string identifying¨uniquely by convention), then encrypt the result using 's public key
. The encrypted text
is then sent out. If traffic is not diverted, this should reach , who will decrypt this using his P Partially supported by the ACI jeunes chercheurs "Sécurité informatique, protocoles cryptographiques et détection d'intrusions" and the ACI cryptologie "Psi-Robuste". Work done while the second author was at LSV. , and send back G U £ 0 ! I # 7 % & ' $ ( 2 to¨.¨waits for such a message at step 2., decrypts it using her private key @ 9 Q B S T 4 F 9 8 , checks that the first component is indeed , then sends back 0 ! I # 7 % & ' $ ( 3 0 £ 2 at step 3. for confirmation. Compare this specification ( Figure 1 ) with excerpts from an actual C implementation of¨'s role in it ( Figure 2) . First, the C code is longer than the specification (although Figure 2 only implements message 1 of Figure 1 ). Difficulties in analyzing such a piece of C code mainly come from other, less visible, problems:
1 int create_nonce (nonce_t *nce) 2 { 3
RAND_bytes(nce->nonce,SIZENONCE); 4 /* % *nce rec nonce(CTX) | context(CTX). % */ 5 return(0); 6 } 7 8 int encrypt_mesg(msg1_t *msg, BIGNUM *key_pub, 9 BIGNUM *key_mod, BIGNUM *cipher) Fig. 2 . A piece of code of a sample C implementation of the NS protocol -First, C is a real programming language, with memory allocation, aliasing, pointer arithmetic; all this is absent from protocol specifications, and must be taken into account. E.g., in Figure 2 , line 80, the pointer cipher1 is set to the address allocated by BN_new(); at line 81, the encryption function encrypt_mesg expects to encrypt its first argument with the key in second and third arguments, putting the result at the address pointed to by its fourth argument cipher1. -C programs are meant to be linked to external libraries, whose code is usually unavailable (e.g., memcpy, strcpy, strncmp, read, write in Figure 2 ) and cannot be analyzed. More subtly, low-level encryption functions should not be analyzed, simply because we do not know any way to recognize that some given bit-mangling code implements, say, RSA or DES. We shall take the approach that such functions should be trusted to do what they are meant to do. -Even without looking at the intricacies of statically analyzing C code, we usually only have the source code of one role at our disposal. For example, the code of Figure 2 implements¨'s role in the protocol of Figure 1 is assumed to be honest, he should only be able to execute the corresponding steps in Figure 1 ).
Alternatively, we could also analyze the source code of two or more roles. But we would still need an external trust model, representing malicious intruders, and honest agents of other protocols which may share secrets with the analyzed programs.
What we do in this paper. We analyze reachability properties of C code implementing roles of cryptographic protocols. Amongst all reachability properties, we shall concentrate on (non-)secrecy, i.e., the ability for a malicious intruder to get hold of some designated, sensitive piece of data. All problems considered here are undecidable: we therefore concentrate on upper approximations of behaviors of programs, i.e., on representations that contain at least all behaviors that the given program may exhibit-in a given external trust model, and a given execution model (see below). In particular, we aim at giving security guarantees. When none can be given by our techniques, just as in other static analyses, it may still be that the analyzed program is in fact safe.
What we do not do. First, we do not infer cryptographic protocols from C code, i.e., we do not infer Figure 1 from Figure 2 . This might have seemed the most reasonable route: when Figure 1 has been reconstructed, use your favorite cryptographic protocol verifier. We do not believe this is practical. First, recall that we usually only have the source code of some of the roles. Even is we had code for all roles, real implementations use many constructs that have no equivalent in input languages for cryptographic protocol verification tools. To take one realistic example, implementations of SSL [10] such as ssh use conditionals, bindings from conventional names such as SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 to algorithms (i.e., records containing function pointers, initialized to specific encryption, decryption, and secure hash functions), which are far from what current cryptographic protocol verification tools offer.
Second, we do not guarantee against any arbitrary attack on C code. Rather, our techniques are able to guarantee that there is no attack on a given piece of C code in a given trust model, stating who we trust, and in a given execution model, i.e., assuming a given, somewhat idealized semantics of C. In this semantics, writing beyond the bounds of an array never occurs. If we did not rely on such idealized semantics, essentially every static analysis would report possible security violations, most of them fake. It follows that buffer overflow attacks will not be considered in this paper. While buffer overflows are probably the most efficient technique of attack against real implementations (even not of cryptographic protocols; for hackers, see [11] ), they can be and have already been analyzed [25, 24] . On programs immune to buffer overflows, we believe our idealized semantics to be a fair account of the semantics of C. Programs should be checked against buffer overflows before our techniques are applied; we consider buffer overflows as an important but independent concern.
Outline After reviewing related work in Section 2, we introduce the subset of C we consider in Section 3, augmented with trust assertions-the cornerstone of our way of describing relations between in-memory values and Dolev-Yao-style messages. Its concrete semantics is described in Section 4, including trust assertions and the external trust model. We describe the associated abstract semantics in Section 5, which approximates C programs plus trust models as sets of Horn clauses, and describe our implementation in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
Related Work
Analyzing cryptographic protocols directly from source code seems to be fairly new. As far as we know, the only previous attempts in this direction are due to El Kadhi and Boury [16, 6] , who propose a framework and algorithms to analyze leakage of confidential data in Java applets. They consider a model of cryptographic security based on the well-known Dolev-Yao model [8] , just as we do. While we use Horn clauses as a uniform mechanism to abstract program semantics, intruder capabilities, and security properties alike, El Kadhi and Boury use a dedicated constraint format, and use a special constraint resolution calculus [16] .
Analyzing cryptographic programs is not just a matter of analyzing cryptographic protocols. El Kadhi and Boury analyze Java applets (from bytecode, not source), and concentrate on a well-behaved subset of Java, where method calls are assumed to be inlined. Aliasing in Java is simpler to handle in Java than in C: the only aliases that may occur in Java arise from objects that can be accessed through different access paths (e.g., different variables); in C, more complex aliases may occur, such as through pointers to variables (see &mesg1 for example in Figure 2 ). The StuPa tool [6] uses different static analysis frameworks to model the Dolev-Yao intruder and to analyze information flow through the analyzed applet; we use a uniform approach based on Horn clauses.
Finally, the security properties examined in [6] are models of leakage of sensitive data: sensitive data are those data stored in specially marked class fields, and are tracked through the program and the possible actions of the intruder; data can be leaked to the Dolev-Yao intruder, or more generally to untrusted classes in the programming environment. The aim of [6] is to detect whether some sensitive piece of data can be leaked to some untrusted class. Because we use Horn clauses, any property which can be expressed as a conjunction of atoms can be checked in our approach (as in [7] ), in particular secrecy or leakage to some untrusted part of the environment.
Cryptographic Protocol Analysis. If we are just interested in cryptographic protocols, not programs, there are now many methods available: see [12] for an overview. One of the most successful models today is the Dolev-Yao model [8] , where all communication channels are assumed to be rerouted to a unique intruder, who can encrypt and decrypt any message at will-provided it knows the inverse key in the case of decryption. Every message sent is just given to the intruder, and every message received is obtained from the intruder. This is the basis of many papers. One of the most relevant to our work is Blanchet's model [3] , where a single predicate
in op.cit.) is used to model what messages may be known to the intruder at any time. The abilities of the intruder are modeled by the following Horn clauses (in our notation):
Intruder can read (3)
Intruder can decrypt (6)
provided he knows (7)
Intruder knows public keys. (9) We shall use a Prolog-like notation throughout: identifiers starting with capital letters, such as . For example, role¨in Figure 1 implements the rules
. This is easily compiled into Horn clauses. A rule w x w y is simply compiled as the clause
, modulo some details. For example, and using Blanchet's trick of coding nonces as function symbols applied to parameters in context (e.g., U
will be coded as
, in any session wherë talks to some agent v ), the role of¨in Figure 1 may be coded as:
Finally, secrecy properties are encoded through negative clauses. For instance, given a specific agent
remains secret when¨is talking to C will be coded as
More complicated queries are possible, e.g.,
asks whether } remains secret whatever agent¨is really talking to, provided this agent is honest, for some definition of honesty (see [7] for example). We won't explore all the variants, and shall be content to know that we can use at least one. Note that the encodings above are upper approximations of the actual behavior of the protocol; this is needed in any case, as cryptographic protocol verification is undecidable [9, 1] .
Program analysis.
There is an even wider literature on static program analysis. Our main problem will be to infer what variables contain what kind of data. As these variables are mostly pointers to structures allocated on the heap, we have to do some kind of shape analysis. The prototypical such analysis is due to Sagiv et al. [22] . This analysis gives very precise information on the shape of objects stored in variables. It is also rather costly. A crucial observation in [22] is that store shapes are better understood as formulae. We shall adapt this idea to a much simplified memory model.
At the other end of the spectrum, Andersen's points-to analysis [2] gives a very rough approximation of what variables may point to what others, but can be computed extremely efficiently [14] . (See [15] for a survey of pointer analyses.) We shall design an analysis that is somewhere in between shape analysis and points-to analysis as far as precision is concerned: knowing whether variable x may point to y is not enough, e.g. we need to know that once lines 77-82 of Figure 2 have been executed, cipher1 points to some allocated record containing¨'s identity as ip_id and that the field mesg1.msg.msg1.nonce contains¨'s nonce U
. (This is already non-trivial; we also need to know that this record actually denotes the term
when seen from the cryptographic protocol viewpoint.) While this looks like what shape analysis does, our analysis will be flow-insensitive, just like standard points-to analyses.
One of our basic observations is that such pointer analyses can be described as generating Horn clauses describing points-to relations. Once this is done (Section 5), it will be easier to link in the cryptographic protocol aspects (e.g., to state that cipher_1 denotes
, as stated above).
C Programs, and Trust Assertions
We assume that C programs are represented as a set of control flow graphs , one for each function . We assume that the source code of each function is known-at least all those that we don't want to abstract away, such as communication and cryptographic primitives. We also consider a restricted subset of C, where casts are absent, and expressions are assumed to be well-typed. We do definitely consider pointers, and in particular pointer arithmetic, one of the major hassles of C semantics.
Formally, we define a C program as a map from function names to triples
, . Edges are labeled with instructions. The set of instructions in 
storing the address of function
taking the address of entry
is trusted to denote°² 
. This of course presumes a given scheduling of elementary instructions; to verify output from a given C compiler, the same scheduling should be used. The test instructions
do nothing, but can only be executed provided is zero, resp. non-zero; they are used to represent if and while branches.
The only non-standard instruction above is the trust assertion. This is one of the main ingredients we use to link concrete C data with abstract Dolev-Yao style messages that they are meant to denote. A trust assertion (e.g.,
, see Section 2) will be defined by the external trust model (see Section 4.2).
We have chosen to let the programmer state trust relations in the C source code using special comments; they are enclosed between /* % and % */ in Figure 2 . For example, the comment at line 20 translates to the trust statement
, and states that, if msg points to a memory zone where message w is stored, and if key_pub points to some zone containing ß , then cipher will be filled with the ciphertext
; in other words, encrypt_mesg computes the encryption of *msg using key *key_pub and stores it into *cipher.
We do require trust assertions. Otherwise, there is no way to recognize statically that the call to BN_mod_exp on line 18 actually computes modular exponentiation on arbitrary sized integers ("bignums", of type BIGNUM), and much less that this encrypts its second argument plain using the key given as third and fourth arguments key_pub, key_mod, storing the result into the first argument cipher. In fact, there is no way to even define a sensible map from bignums to terms that would give their purported meaning in the Dolev-Yao model.
We need such trust assertions for two distinct purposes. The first is to describe the effect of functions in the API in terms of the Dolev-Yao model; in particular, to abstract away the effect of low-level cryptographic functions that are used in the analyzed program (e.g., the OpenSSL crypto lib), or of the standard C library (see the comment on line 47, which abstracts away the behavior of the write function, stating that any message sent to write through the buffer buf will be known to the Dolev-Yao intruder). The second purpose of trust assertions is to state initial security assumptions: see the comment on line 67, which states that the array ip_id is trusted to contain u 's identity, initially. (The notation CTX(Agent(A)) refers to u 's identity as given in a global context CTX; we shall not describe this in detail here.)
Concrete Semantics
We first describe the memory layout. Let
be a denumerable set of so-called addresses. A store
is any map from adresses to zones. Intuitively, addresses are those memory addresses returned by memory allocation functions, e.g., malloc. (As a technical aside, we assume that declaring a local C variable x in a C function has the effect of allocating some memory, too, for holding x's value, at an address that is usually written &x in C. We do this because, contrarily to, say, Java, you can take the address of variables in C, and modify them through pointer operations.) Zones describe the layout of data stored at given addresses, and are described by the following grammar: is defined and of the form 
for some
, and s
Fig. 5. Concrete semantics
vironments mapping variables to their addresses. This is shown in Figure 5 . 
, and at which the contents of variable is stored in memory (the address usually referred to as Ñ in C code), and copying it into the address
at which is stored. In effect, ã in C really means
. To lighten up the semantics, we agree that mentioning any expression entails that it is defined. In other words, the mere fact that we are writing . This is taken care of by starting the program in a store that contains such a mapping from addresses to code fragments (and similarly contains storage for string constants).
Most other entries are self-explanatory. In the semantics of primitive calls
, we assume that the semantic
of £ is given separately. Figure 5 leaves out the semantics for function calls
. We let , where ae is obtained by allocating one new structure for formal parameters, one for local variables, and one for the return value (i.e., . At the level of zones and pointers which we consider in this section, trust assertions just do nothing. We shall extend this semantics in the next section to properly handle trust assertions.
Semantics of Trust Assertions
The purpose of trust assertions is to define the denotation of concrete C data as DolevYao style messages. A given piece of C data may have one such denotation, or zero (e.g., if just denotes, say, some index into a table, with no significance, securitywise), or several (e.g., if only for cardinality reasons, there are infinitely many terms but only finitely many 128-bit integers; concretely, even cryptographic hash functions have collisions.) Therefore we model the semantics of trust assertions as generating a trust relation -a binary relation between C values and ground first-order termstogether with a trust base , i.e., a pointer, should also represent a C value. This is needed: in Figure 2 , we really want to understand the pointer cipher1 (l.55) as denoting a message. But only the contents of the zone pointed to by cipher1 should be relevant, not the location ò . The irrelevance of ò is best handled through the notion of bisimilarity, which we define by imitation from [18] . A bisimulation is a binary relation
, together with a binary relation (again written ) on
, such that: ;
, and for every
, and of a location and a store ae describes a rooted graph in memory, whose root is ò , and whose edges are given by following pointers. Then, each rooted graph can be unfolded to yield an infinite tree. It is standard that bisimilarity relates up to bisimilarity: we therefore let U be the quotient
. We let . That is, ordinary C instructions do not modify the trust relation or the trust base, and otherwise behave in the standard way.
When is the trust assertion . Trust assertions are given as special C comments. E.g., the trust assertion on line 20 of Figure 2 states that encrypt_mesg really encrypts: we trust that, at the end of encrypt_mesg, cipher points to the encryption crypt(M,K) of the plaintext pointed to by msg with key pointed to by key_pub. Line 47 states that we trust write to make anything the contents of the buffer buf available to the Dolev-Yao intruder.
The External Trust Model
As we have already said in the introduction, programs such as SSL or the one of Figure 2 cannot be analyzed in isolation. We have to describe how the outside world, i.e., the other programs with which the analyzed programs communicates, behaves. This is in particular needed because the canonical trust statement for write is to declare that
holds whenever its input argument is trusted to denote message Ú ; and the canonical trust statement for read is to declare that the contents of the buffer given as input will denote any message
. (This is the standard assumption in the Dolev-Yao model, that all communication is to and from an all powerful intruder.)
Concretely, in particular, we have to describe the semantics of the
predicate, meant to represent all messages that a Dolev-Yao intruder may build. We do this by providing clauses such as (1)- (9), but also such as (10)- (11) to describe an abstract view of the roles of honest principals participating in the same or other protocols, and which are believed to share secrets with the analyzed program. Such clauses can be built from spi-calculus terms for example, following either Blanchet's [3] 
Abstract Semantics
be the set of abstract stores and abstract environments. It does not matter much really how we represent these. Any static analysis of C code that is able of handling pointer aliases would probably do the job. We choose one that matches the simplicity of points-to analysis as much as we can. We associate an abstract zone with each variable (local or global), and with each memory allocation site, in the form of a fresh constant, taken from a finite set. An atomic formula ; this considerably simplifies the abstract semantics. We define the abstract semantics
, mapping variable names to abstract zones, a.k.a., constants, as sets of Horn clauses. The semantics of a function, resp. a whole program, is just the union of the semantics of all instructions in the given control flow graphs. In Figure 6 , we use the convention that
. This is recalled in the first rule, and omitted in later rules. In the second and third clauses, we assume that constants and functions can also serve as term constants when used in clauses. For the sake of precision, integer constants thus recorded are not used in computing , we assume the types of all variables to be completely known; this determines the right form of term
in the bodies of clauses (in the first case, it yields the length of the expanded array; the fictitious element l Ü 4 Õ ¡ is added so as to cope with the fact that E T ¡ is legal C code although E T ¡
is not a valid element; while
is syntactic sugar for some term where field labels have been ordered in some way, and ÷ denotes the entry corresponding to the label). The abstract semantics for function calls is implemented as in [14] . We leave its formal expression as a (tedious) exercise. Intuitively, calling the known function
works as though the actual parameters were copied, using runof-the-mill assignments, into global locations One advantage of this points-to-like abstract semantics is that the semantic of trust assertions is as simple as it can be: just add the trust assertion as a clause, replacing all C variables by their location
as a substitution, this means applying the substitution
. This abstract semantics is of course rather coarse. One may improve somehow the precision of the analysis by renaming local variables after each assignment, in effect using variants of the SSA form.
Checking Abstract Properties
Once the abstract semantics of the program has been computed, as a set of Horn clauses, add the external trust model wise, we can approximate them as follows. We assume without loss of generality that only monadic predicate symbols occur; e.g., , and repeat the process on the latter clauses. This yields clauses in ¿ ¡
, and is guaranteed to have a least Herbrand model that is an upper approximation of that of the original clause set. (In effect, this defines a set-constraint based typing discipline.) Since most clauses arise from the abstract semantics of the program, we do not lose much precision by doing this second abstraction step. Moreover, past experience in the verification of cryptographic protocols demonstrates that this does not throw away any essential information [13] . We have yet to evaluate whether this abstraction to ¿ ¡ remains practical in the context of program verification.
Implementation
We have implemented this in the CSur project [21] . In a first phase, a specific compiler csur_cc reads, manages and generates a control-flow graph for each function of the program. All control flow graphs are stored in a unique table. Starting from the main function, the second phase uses a hybrid analyzer (computing abstract memory zones and collecting all Horn clauses for all program points) and performs function calls using the above table. Our tool follows the Compile-Link-Analysis technique of Heintze and Tardieu [14] .
For each function, a control flow graph is generated and the compiler collects types for each variable of programs. For all types, the physical representation is also computed (using low level representations, for example field offsets of structures are computed as seen as Figure 4) . Finally a linker merges all control flow graphs and types into a unique table. In the same way a library manager csur_ar (used just like ar) was implemented to help collect control flow graphs as single archives. These tools are defined as gcc front-ends to collect compilation options of source file.
The csur_cc compiler also collects trust assertions as it analyzes C code, and spits out a collection of Horn clauses which are then fed to an ¿ ¡ solver-currently SPASS [27, 26] or the first author's prototype h1 prover. The fact that most clauses are in ¿ ¤
, a polynomial class, is a treat: despite several optimizations meant to decrease the number of generated clauses, a running 229 line implementation (excluding included files) of 's role in the Needham-Schroeder protocol results in a set of 459 clauses.
Conclusion
This paper is one of the first attempts at analyzing actual implementations of cryptographic protocols. Our aim is not to detect subtle buffer overflows, which are better handled by other techniques, but to detect the same kind of bugs that cryptographic protocols are fraught with, only on actual implementations. We must say that combining the intricacies of analyzing C code with cryptographic protocol verification is still a challenge. This can be seen from the fact that our abstract semantics for C is still fairly imprecise. First experiments however show that this is enough on the small examples we tested. Despite the shortcomings that our approach clearly still has, and which will be the subject of future work, we would like to stress the importance of trust assertions as a logical way of linking the in-memory model of values to the abstract Dolev-Yao model of messages; and the fact that compiling to Horn clauses is an effective, yet simple way of checking complex trust and security properties.
